The Cold War marked a period of Stress between superpowers: that of the USA (and by extension, the West) and the USSR and the East. This hostility began after the Second World War, despite the supposed Friendship between the two superpowers during the war as allies against Hitler and Fascism. Whether the stress between the superpowers was caused by their differing ideologies (the capitalist West and the communist East) or a clash between national interests and strong personalities is a matter for debate. Winston Churchill could be said to have helped cause the Cold War because of his ideological differences with Stalin. His 1946 ‘Iron Curtain’ speech certainly caused tension: it unveiled to the world Stalin’s increasing “Soviet sphere” and “increasing measure of control from Moscow”, strongly showing his disapproval of Stalin’s swooping over Eastern Europe and inferring his strongly anti-communist stance. However, this speech was given in 1946, and Churchill was no longer the Prime Minister; that role had passed to Clement Attlee, inferring that he felt he was only able to make such a blunt statement of his views once he was out of power. Conversely, when he was in high office, Churchill was able to work well with Stalin – he called him “Uncle Joe”, inferring they were more than just cordial allies working purely against Stalin. In fact, the Iron Curtain speech could be seen as hypocritical as Churchill made an agreement with Stalin which allowed him to have 75% of influence in Bulgaria and 90% in Romania, two of the places he referenced in the speech. Conversely, it could be construed that Churchill knew he had to work with Stalin the best he could, but nonetheless did not share his ideas. While their relationship during the war could have been seen as constructive, ultimately Churchill’s anti-communist stance caused tension, inferring that ideological differences did have more input into the origins of the Cold War.
The leaders during 1945 were able to work
well together for a joint aim – to defeat Fascism – regardless of ideological
differences. Franklin Roosevelt, for instance, was optimistic that he would
still be able to work with Stalin after the war had ended, inferring a
conciliatory and not necessarily biased nature against communism. In fact,
Roosevelt saved the American economy with a socialist policy known as the New
Deal, using federal government funding and stimulus in order to bring America
out of depression. Stalin would potentially be able to relate to his aims and
methods in that sense, and therefore could work with him as they held common
ground. Regrettably, Roosevelt’s death in 1945 caused his vice-president, Harry
Truman, to take control of the presidency. Truman’s inexperience in foreign
policy was reflected in his workings with Stalin, Truman’s decision not to inform Stalin of
the Manhattan Project would have caused their relationship to worsen. The
atomic bomb was an incredibly destructive weapon; not revealing it to Stalin
could infer that Truman intended to intimidate Stalin with it, doubtlessly
increasing Stalin’s suspicion of America. Its use also ensured that Stalin had
no part in the defeat of Japan. Stalin might have considered this a slight as
Russia had historical tensions with Japan after the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, in
which the Russians lost territory to their enemies. As Truman had effectively
stopped Stalin from enacting revenge on those who gave Russia an embarrassing
defeat, it could be seen that Truman’s heavy handed foreign policy ideals
caused the alienation of the Soviet Union, allowing the situation to plunge
into one of mutual hostility.
The ideologies underpinning the two great
superpowers can be seen to be instrumental in the origins of the Cold War. In
the Western world, retaining liberty and liberalism had taken Britain into the
Second World War, and therefore they were willing to protect that as much as
they could in the face of fascism. Whether Stalin’s actions were purely
motivated by the wish to spread his own ideology is a matter of debate, but his
use of Communism to permeate eastern Europe and create a bloc of countries
under his control is undeniable. The spread of communism obviously made the
Western leaders very uncomfortable. Truman based his entire strategy of
containment on George Kennan’s frank analysis of communism and its leaders in
the USSR, perhaps inferring that he judged ideology to be the most prevalent
problem in the USSR and that his opposition was towards communism and not the
Russians himself: Kennan recognised the Russian people as being “by and large,
friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it”;
he implies the entire problem is the ideology, and the leaders who believe in
it. The American hostility to communism (and Soviet distrust of capitalism)
therefore played a huge role in the shaping of the Cold War as it was to
become. The core ideologies of the Western and
Eastern powers did help form the base of the Cold War. National priorities –
such as the need for a free market to sell goods– are often dictated by the ideology
which the country supports. However, this seems to be more relevant to the USA
than the USSR; it has been suggested that the USSR lost its priority to spread
international communism in 1921, as civil war loomed. Eastern Europe seemed to
be affected more by Stalin’s need to protect and build up his country than any
real desire to spread communism; the ideology seemed to be a means to an end,
rather than the integral purpose of creating the Eastern bloc. Stalin’s
personality, suspicions of the West and need to protect the USSR from attack
could therefore be construed to be more important than ideology, in which case
it can be concluded that while ideology played an undeniable part in the
origins of the Cold War, both national interests and the leadership driving the
superpowers certainly played an important part. Indeed, it could be construed
that if Churchill and Roosevelt had remained in power, the Cold War might have
been delayed or even avoided completely.
The leaders during 1945 were able to work
well together for a joint aim – to defeat Fascism – regardless of ideological
differences. Franklin Roosevelt, for instance, was optimistic that he would
still be able to work with Stalin after the war had ended, inferring a
conciliatory and not necessarily biased nature against communism. In fact,
Roosevelt saved the American economy with a socialist policy known as the New
Deal, using federal government funding and stimulus in order to bring America
out of depression. Stalin would potentially be able to relate to his aims and
methods in that sense, and therefore could work with him as they held common
ground. Regrettably, Roosevelt’s death in 1945 caused his vice-president, Harry
Truman, to take control of the presidency. Truman’s inexperience in foreign
policy was reflected in his workings with Stalin, Truman’s decision not to inform Stalin of
the Manhattan Project would have caused their relationship to worsen. The
atomic bomb was an incredibly destructive weapon; not revealing it to Stalin
could infer that Truman intended to intimidate Stalin with it, doubtlessly
increasing Stalin’s suspicion of America. Its use also ensured that Stalin had
no part in the defeat of Japan. Stalin might have considered this a slight as
Russia had historical tensions with Japan after the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, in
which the Russians lost territory to their enemies. As Truman had effectively
stopped Stalin from enacting revenge on those who gave Russia an embarrassing
defeat, it could be seen that Truman’s heavy handed foreign policy ideals
caused the alienation of the Soviet Union, allowing the situation to plunge
into one of mutual hostility.
The ideologies underpinning the two great
superpowers can be seen to be instrumental in the origins of the Cold War. In
the Western world, retaining liberty and liberalism had taken Britain into the
Second World War, and therefore they were willing to protect that as much as
they could in the face of fascism. Whether Stalin’s actions were purely
motivated by the wish to spread his own ideology is a matter of debate, but his
use of Communism to permeate eastern Europe and create a bloc of countries
under his control is undeniable. The spread of communism obviously made the
Western leaders very uncomfortable. Truman based his entire strategy of
containment on George Kennan’s frank analysis of communism and its leaders in
the USSR, perhaps inferring that he judged ideology to be the most prevalent
problem in the USSR and that his opposition was towards communism and not the
Russians himself: Kennan recognised the Russian people as being “by and large,
friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it”;
he implies the entire problem is the ideology, and the leaders who believe in
it. The American hostility to communism (and Soviet distrust of capitalism)
therefore played a huge role in the shaping of the Cold War as it was to
become. The core ideologies of the Western and
Eastern powers did help form the base of the Cold War. National priorities –
such as the need for a free market to sell goods– are often dictated by the ideology
which the country supports. However, this seems to be more relevant to the USA
than the USSR; it has been suggested that the USSR lost its priority to spread
international communism in 1921, as civil war loomed. Eastern Europe seemed to
be affected more by Stalin’s need to protect and build up his country than any
real desire to spread communism; the ideology seemed to be a means to an end,
rather than the integral purpose of creating the Eastern bloc. Stalin’s
personality, suspicions of the West and need to protect the USSR from attack
could therefore be construed to be more important than ideology, in which case
it can be concluded that while ideology played an undeniable part in the
origins of the Cold War, both national interests and the leadership driving the
superpowers certainly played an important part. Indeed, it could be construed
that if Churchill and Roosevelt had remained in power, the Cold War might have
been delayed or even avoided completely.
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References
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/truman_01.shtml
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/g/gaddis-war.html
http://hnn.us/article/36194
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